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CDSN COVID Response Recommendations and Future Directions 

On April 27th, members of the Canadian Defence and Security Network, along with participants from MINDS-funded networks (SPNET, DSF, NAADSN) met online to develop preliminary answers to questions we received from the MINDS program at the Department of National Defence as well as questions we developed. The questions largely fit into the five themes of the CDSN: Operations, Security, Personnel, Procurement, and Civil-Military Relations. Below, we briefly present the responses which represent a consensus (not every individual or organization agreed to every single response). The CDSN will develop fuller discussions over the next few months, but the urgency of the crisis compels us to release our recommendations and questions as soon as we can.   

Before discussing each group���s findings, one common theme emerged from each group���s discussion: The government ought to consider a new Defence Policy Review as many of the assumptions of the previous one have shifted. Many group findings overlapped with other groups. 

Operations 

What role is there for the CAF to support Canada during and after the pandemic? COVID 19 is expected to change the nature of conflict in the following ways: 

• Borders are expected to matter more (both domestic and international)
• Authoritarian regimes will both harden and may be more financially vulnerable
• Revisionist powers are likely to engage in more disinformation operations
• New adversaries may emerge especially as US leadership/priorities are uncertain
• Allied priorities may change
• The pandemic can be used as an asymmetric weapon
• Poor humanitarian conditions will amplify existing tensions leading to more refugees and internally displaced peoples

GOC should survey the nature and rationale for allied responses to COVID and new defence and security priorities. These discussions must inform the return to a new ���normal��� operational stance. 

Security

How has COVID-19 changed the geopolitical landscape? What are the likely short-term impacts of the pandemic on international relations, defence and security?

• Gives hostile players���Russia, China, Iran, etc���additional leverage in their regions with more fodder for cyber/hybrid efforts.
• Create openings for cooperation and institutional adaptation of the WHO where Canada can offer leadership & promote civil-mil expertise development for pandemic collaboration.
• Human security dialogue shifting ��� a non-military threat is creating great harm. Global and national level social inequalities will be exacerbated by the crisis, given that women, minorities and poorer individuals appear to be among the most affected.
• Globalization threatened as local production of PPE, vaccines, treatment become imperative.

If deployment is increasingly ���local��� how might this impact the relationships that CAF has with other ���security providers���, such as local police, academics, the public, health officials, etc. 

• There should be a standing committee or task force for dealing with CAF deployments in Canada so that provinces, federal departments, and other relevant actors have familiarity with CAF capabilities and procedures and for the CAF to have similar understanding of its partners with a Deputy Minister responsible for reporting to the Prime Minister.  Canada might want to consider developing a FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency] type organization within Public Safety or create a new agency entirely or resurrect the Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness.

Personnel

How does Op Laser impact preparedness and readiness? Do we need to think of an increased role for the reserves as we think of potential future pandemics? How is Op Laser impacting the willingness to deploy of both the reg force and reserves?

• The reg force and reserves are impacted differently. One key consideration here is the lack of job security reservists might have in their day job & how that impact deployability.
• Deployments during pandemic creates additional stressors on military families as usual resources are not available, plus kids are not in school. It is harder to deploy when your own family is not safe and secure and is exacerbated for dual-military couples.
• Reservations were expressed about the CAF stepping into eldercare. This drains the CAF of its own healthcare capability and is not a sustainable solution.

Procurement

What are the assumptions for 10% or 20% reductions in the defence budget? Particularly in terms of the timing and process involved in either set of cuts?  

• Govt may allow departments to identify potential cuts or it may freeze spending and ask departments to find savings. Unclear whether/how cuts may play out.
• Avoid equal misery. Some parts of the CAF will have to be cut further than others, cutting proportionately leads to significant inefficiencies.
• Focus on outputs and enterprise level optimization as a means to generate efficiency and savings.

How can DND/CAF help to grow the economy following COVID-19?

• As demand was cut by order of government, there is no need to stimulate economy.
• If stimulus is desired, spending on the CAF is not the best tool.  Focus should be on lump sum payments to low income earners and infrastructure investments.

Civil-Military Relations

How can the CAF work more closely with other government departments and agencies, civil society organizations, and the communities in which they serve to prepare for and prevent the spread of infectious disease?

• Develop and disseminate Principles of Involvement that define what the CAF can and cannot do in Canada during the pandemic, both in terms of capability and legal restrictions, akin to rules of engagement but unclassified.
• This is a rare opportunity to demonstrate the work of CAF members to other Canadians.  Doing it well may help in the post-COVID budget fight and boost recruitment.

How can the DND/CAF further leverage social/digital applications for flat (vs. hierarchal) communications?

• Develop a better capacity for virtual collaboration. Consider reforming security classification so that more work can be done over unclassified systems.
• The digital space is more than just a domain for cyber conflict with the pandemic revealing much confusion about not just how to analyze the data but whether the data is good. Need to recruit and train people with data analytics capabilities.
• Assess online training resources being used while much of DND/CAF is staying at home, to determine which ones work best, which features/designs get more engagement.
• No consensus on whether it is CAF���s responsibility to defend Canadian ���cognitive��� sovereignty.  Who should be fighting against foreign disinformation campaigns aimed at public? More clarity needed from gov���t about CAF���s role in disinformation fight.

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COVID - Recommandations de r矇ponse du CDSN et orientations futures 

Les membres du R矇seau canadien de la d矇fense et de s矇curit矇, ainsi que les participants des r矇seaux de recherches(SPNET, DSFG, RDSNAA) financ矇s par le programme Mobilisation des id矇es nouvelles en mati癡re de d矇fense et de s矇curit矇 (MINDS) du D矇partement du la d矇fense national (MDN) se sont rencontr矇s virtuellement le 27 avril, 2020 pour discuter des questions que nous avons re癟ues du Minist癡re ainsi qu���aux questions que nous avons propos矇es. Les questions s���inspirent en grande partie des cinq th癡mes du R矇seau canadien de la d矇fense et de s矇curit矇 (RCDS): Op矇rations, S矇curit矇, Personnel, Approvisionnement et Relations civilo-militaires. Ci-dessous, nous pr矇sentons bri癡vement les r矇ponses qui repr矇sentent une partie et non pas l���ensemble de la discussion. Le RCDS entamera des discussions plus approfondies au cours des prochains mois, mais l���urgence de la crise nous oblige �� publier nos recommandations et nos questions d癡s que possible.   

Nous avons partag矇, ci-dessous, les grandes lignes qui ont encadr矇s nos discussions. A priori, les participants 矇taient tous d���accord que le MDN dans les circonstances actuelles devrait consid矇rer un nouvel Examen de la politique de d矇fense pour renforcer les capacit矇s des Forces arm矇es canadiennes canadiennes (FAC) en tenant compte des r矇alit矇s de la pand矇mie de la COVID-19, ce que le dernier Examen n���avait pas pu consid矇r矇 quand il a 矇t矇 r矇diger.  

倏梯矇娶硃喧勳棗紳莽&紳莉莽梯;

What role is there for the CAF to support Canada during and after the pandemic? Le COVID 19 changera la nature des conflits de la mani癡re suivante: 

• Les fronti癡res auront plus d���importance.
• Les r矇gimes autoritaires vont �� la fois se durcir et 礙tre plus vuln矇rables financi癡rement
• Les pouvoirs r矇visionnistes seront plus susceptibles de s'engager dans davantage d'op矇rations de d矇sinformation
• De nouveaux adversaires pourraient 矇merger
• Les priorit矇s de nos alli矇es vont changer
• La pand矇mie peut 礙tre utilis矇e comme arme asym矇trique
•  Les mauvaises conditions humanitaires amplifieront les tensions existantes, ce qui entra簾nera un plus grand nombre de r矇fugi矇s et de personnes d矇plac矇es.

Le gouvernement du Canada devrait 矇tudier la nature et la justification des r矇ponses des alli矇s au COVID et les nouvelles priorit矇s en mati癡re de d矇fense et de s矇curit矇. Ces discussions doivent 矇clairer le retour �� une nouvelle position op矇rationnelle 竄 normale 罈. 

釦矇釵喝娶勳喧矇&紳莉莽梯;

How has COVID-19 changed the geopolitical landscape? What are the likely short-term impacts of the pandemic on international relations, defence and security? 

• Les pays autoritaires comme la Russie, Chine, et l���Iran, etc. pourraient exploiter la pand矇mie comme levier suppl矇mentaire dans leurs r矇gions, notamment pour amplifier leurs efforts cybern矇tiques /hybrides.
• La pand矇mie pourrait entam矇 des r矇formes au seins des ONG comme l���OMS. Le Canada peut offrir du leadership et promouvoir le d矇veloppement d���une expertise militaire civile pour la collaboration en cas de pand矇mie.
• Les in矇galit矇s sociales aux niveaux mondial et national seront exacerb矇es par la crise, 矇tant donn矇 que les femmes, les minorit矇s et les personnes les plus d矇munies semblent 礙tre parmi les plus touch矇es. La pand矇mie est une occasion pour une conversation sur la s矇curit矇 humaine.
• Avec les r矇percussions de la pand矇mie (manque de production de d���EPI, m矇dicaments, par exemple), la mondialisation va 礙tre mis en question.

If deployment is increasingly ���local��� how might this impact the relationships that CAF has with other ���security providers���, such as local police, academics, the public, health officials, etc.

• Il devrait y avoir un comit矇 permanent ou un groupe de travail pour s���occuper des d矇ploiements des FAC au Canada afin que les provinces, les minist癡res f矇d矇raux et les autres intervenants concern矇s connaissent bien les capacit矇s et les proc矇dures des FAC, et les FAC aient une compr矇hension similaire de leurs partenaires avec un sous-ministre responsable qui se rel癡ve directement au Premier ministre.  Le Canada pourrait 矇galement envisager de cr矇er une organisation du type FEMA (Agence f矇d矇rale de gestion des urgences) au sein de S矇curit矇 publique Canada ou cr矇er une nouvelle agence enti癡rement ou sous le parrainage de la S矇curit矇 publique et la Protection civile.

Personnel

How does Op Laser impact preparedness and readiness? Do we need to think of an increased role for the reserves as we think of potential future pandemics? How is Op Laser impacting the willingness to deploy of both the reg force and reserves?

• Les forces r矇guli癡res et les r矇serves sont touch矇es diff矇remment. Les r矇servistes craignaient souvent qu���ils\elles vont perdre leurs emplois s���ils/elles prennent un cong矇 sans solde pour qu���ils/elles puissent d矇ployer.
• Les d矇ploiements pendant une pand矇mie cr矇ent un stress suppl矇mentaire pour les familles des FACs. Les parents doivent contenter avec la scolarisation �� la maison, les garderies qui sont ferm矇es, etc. Ce stresse se multiplient si les familles ont deux parents dans les FACs, et s���ils n���ont pas de recours �� la famille 矇tendue (grands-parents, par exemple) pour des raisons de distanciation sociale.
• Des doutes ont 矇t矇 exprim矇s au sujet de la participation des FAC aux soins aux a簾n矇s. Cela prive les FAC de leur propre capacit矇 de soins de sant矇 et n���est pas une solution �� long terme.

Relations civilo-militaires

How can the CAF work more closely with other government departments and agencies, civil society organizations, and the communities in which they serve to prepare for and prevent the spread of infectious disease? 

• ��laborer et diffuser des principes de participation qui d矇finissent ce que les FAC peuvent et ne peuvent pas faire au Canada pendant la pand矇mie - le plan des capacit矇s ainsi que des restrictions juridiques, comme les r癡gles d���engagement, mais non classifie.
• La FAC dans nos communaut矇s une occasion de d矇montrer le travail et le r繫le des membres des FACs �� d���autres Canadiens.  Si la FAC peut d矇montrer ce qu���ils font dans les fronti癡res Canadiennes, ceci va leur aider post-COVID 19 �� r矇sister des coupures budg矇taires.

How can the DND/CAF further leverage social media/digital applications for flat (vs hierarchal) communications? 

• D矇velopper une meilleure capacit矇 de collaboration virtuelle.  Envisager de r矇former la classification de s矇curit矇 afin qu���il soit possible de faire plus de travail sur les syst癡mes non classifi矇s.
• L���espace num矇rique est plus qu���un simple domaine de cyber-conflit avec la pand矇mie r矇v矇lant beaucoup de confusion sur la fa癟on non seulement d���analyser les donn矇es, mais si les donn矇es sont bonnes.  Besoin de recruter et de former des personnes ayant des capacit矇s d���analyse de donn矇es.
• ��valuer les ressources de formation en ligne utilis矇es pendant qu���une grande partie du MDN et des FAC reste �� la maison, afin de d矇terminer celles qui fonctionnent le mieux, les caract矇ristiques et les conceptions qui suscitent un plus grand engagement.
• Il n���y a pas de consensus sur la responsabilit矇 des FAC de d矇fendre la souverainet矇 竄 cognitive 罈 du Canada.  Qui devrait lutter contre les campagnes de d矇sinformation 矇trang癡res destin矇es au public?  Il faut plus de clart矇s de la part du gouvernement au sujet du r繫le des FAC dans la lutte contre la d矇sinformation.